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Abstract. Consider an argument A that is attacked by an argument B, while A is
preferred to B. Existing approaches will either ignore the attack or reverse it. In this
paper we introduce a new reduction of preference and attack to defeat, based on the
idea that in such a case, instead of ignoring the attack, the preference is ignored.
We compare this new reduction with the two existing ones using a principle-based
approach, for the four Dung semantics. The principle-based or axiomatic approach
is a methodology to choose an argumentation semantics for a particular applica-
tion, and to guide the search for new argumentation semantics. For this analysis,
we also introduce a fourth reduction, and a semantics for preference-based argu-
mentation based on extension selection. Our classification of twenty alternatives for
preference-based abstract argumentation semantics using six principles suggests
that our new reduction has some advantages over the existing ones, in the sense that
if the set of preferences increases, the sets of accepted arguments increase as well.
Keywords. Formal argumentation, abstract argumentation, preference, axiomatic
approach, principle-based approach
1. Introduction
Preferences are used in abstract argumentation to represent the comparative strength of
arguments. Roughly, there are two positions on preference-based argumentation (PAF).
One position handles preference at the abstract level of Dung’s argumentation frame-
work (AF), assuming a preference order between arguments. Another position is skepti-
cal about this approach, on the grounds that the assumptions made at the abstract level
may not hold when considering preferences at the structured level [12]. As arguments
are treated in an absolutely abstract way, the proponents of the second position claim, it
is no wonder that strange things may happen.
This paper takes the first point of view, and to address the above criticism, it
puts some order in the study of how PAFs behave by adopting a principle-based ap-
proach. Amgoud and Vesic [3] propose to study preference-based argumentation using a
principle-based approach, which was developed more generally for extension-based ab-
stract argumentation semantics by Baroni and Giacomin [5,14]. In particular, Amgoud
and Vesic study so-called Conflict-freeness and Generalisation. We extend their study
with a new principle, called Extension Growth: if we add preferences, then we can in-
fer more. There are various reasons why the intersection of the extensions grows: either
there are less extensions, or the extensions become larger, or both. We therefore study
also principles that consider only one of these two aspects, such as Extension Selection.
September 2016
2. Preference-based Argumentation
In Dung’s approach [9] the acceptance of an argument depends only on the defeat re-
lation among arguments and the chosen argumentation semantics. The outcome of an
argumentation framework is a set of sets of arguments, called extensions and denoted
by E(A ,Def), that are robust against defeats. Dung distinguishes several definitions of
extension (e.g. complete, grounded, preferred, stable), each corresponding to an accept-
ability semantics that formally rules the argument evaluation process [9].
Definition 1 (Argumentation framework [9]) An argumentation framework (AF) is a
tuple 〈A ,Def〉 where A is a set of arguments and Def ⊆ A ×A is a binary defeat
relation. For a,b ∈A , (a,b) ∈ Def stands for a defeats b.
The defeat relation was called “attack” relation by Dung [9], but in preference-based
argumentation this name is used for another relation.
Definition 2 (Preference-based argumentation framework [1]) A preference-based
argumentation framework (PAF) is a 3-tuple 〈A ,Att,〉 whereA is a set of arguments,
Att is a binary attack relation ⊆A ×A and  is a partial order (irreflexive and transi-
tive) overA , called preference relation. For a,b∈A , (a,b)∈Att stands for a attacks b.
To compute the extensions of a preference-based argumentation framework 〈A ,Att,〉
the latter can be reduced to a Dung’s AF 〈A ,Def〉. We say that 〈A ,Att,〉 represents
〈A ,Def〉. The extensions of a preference-based argumentation framework, denoted by
E (A ,Att,), are simply the extensions of the argumentation framework it represents.
Definition 3 provides two ways proposed to reduce a PAF into Dung’s AF. Reduction 1
has been commonly used in almost all approaches to preference-based argumentation.
An attack succeeds only when the attacked argument is not preferred to the attacker. This
reduction has been criticised by Amgoud and Vesic [3] as it may lead to non conflict-free
extensions. The problem occurs when there is an attack from an argument to a preferred
argument. This attack is called critical by Amgoud and Vesic [3]. Amgoud and Vesic [3]
have proposed to repair the argumentation framework. They extended Reduction 1 by
enforcing a defeat from an argument to another when the former is preferred but attacked
by the latter. This is Reduction 2.
Definition 3 (Existing reductions of PAF to AF) Let 〈A ,Att,〉 be a PAF and 〈A ,Def〉
be the AF it represents.
• Reduction 1 [1]: ∀a,b ∈A : (a,b) ∈ Def iff (a,b) ∈ Att,b 6 a.
• Reduction 2 [3]: ∀a,b ∈ A : (a,b) ∈ Def iff ((a,b) ∈ Att,b 6 a) or
((b,a) ∈ Att,(a,b) 6∈ Att,a b).
Example 1 (Reduction 1 and 2) Let 〈A ,Att,〉 with A = {a,b}, Att = {(a,b)} and
b  a. With Reduction 1 we have Def = /0. Both a and b are accepted using any seman-
tics although they are conflicting w.r.t. Att. With reduction 2 we have (b,a) ∈ Def. b is
accepted.
Reduction 2 is based on an implicit strong constraint that an argument never succeeds
to attack a preferred argument. This view gives a power to preferred arguments. It is
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easy to construct examples where this is counterintuitive. For example, consider a parent
who refuses that his child watches TV in the evening during the week because he has
courses. However, the child says that his courses have been cancelled. Then to maintain
the refusal to watch TV the parent should provide another argument attacking his child’s
argument.
It is well known from other areas of knowledge representation, that it is not too hard
to find a counterexample for any kind of representation. In other words, sometimes we
have to rephrase examples such that they give the desired conclusions. However, the ex-
ample suggests that there are straightforward alternatives to Reduction 1 or 2. Moreover,
Reduction 3 can be criticized arguing that it would not be natural to make successful an
attack from a less preferred argument. Reduction 4 below mixes Reduction 2 and 3.
Definition 4 (New reductions from PAF to AF) Let 〈A ,Att,〉 be a PAF and 〈A ,Def〉
be the AF it represents.
• Reduction 3 ∀a,b ∈ A : (a,b) ∈ Def iff ((a,b) ∈ Att,b 6 a) or ((a,b) ∈
Att,(b,a) 6∈ Att).
• Reduction 4 ∀a,b ∈ A : (a,b) ∈ Def iff ((a,b) ∈ Att,b 6 a) or ((b,a) ∈
Att,(a,b) 6∈ Att,a b) or ((a,b) ∈ Att,(b,a) 6∈ Att).
Example 2 (Example 1 continued – Reduction 3 and 4) With Reduction 3 we have
(a,b) ∈ Def. a is accepted. With Reduction 4 we have (a,b) ∈ Def and (b,a) ∈ Def. The
grounded extension is empty, complete extensions are {},{a},{b}, and there are two
preferred/stable extensions {a} and {b}.
The following example further illustrates the four reductions.
Example 3 Assume the PAF visualised below, where we added an argument c, and b
attacks c, c attacks a. For reduction 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively, as visualised below,
PAF semantics give {{a,b}}, {{b}}, no extensions for stable and {{}} for the rest, and
{{b},{}} for complete, the first for preferred and stable, the latter for grounded. Note
that when no preference is assumed among arguments, then no argument is accepted,
i.e., the grounded extension is empty. Now, when a preference of b over a is added, one
would maybe expect to get b accepted, possibly c could be accepted but there does not
seem to be any reason to accept a. Nevertheless, Reduction 1 gives the counterintuitive
result to accept both a and b.
c
a
b
b a
c
a
b
c
a
b
c
a
b
c
a
b
3. Extension selection based on preferences
To illustrate our principles we introduce a PAF semantics that is not based on a reduc-
tion, but on extension selection. Assume a set of extensions, and a preference relation
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over arguments. To get the best extensions, we need to lift the preference relation over
arguments to a preference relation over sets of arguments, or extensions. It is well known
that there are various ways to make this lifting more precise, see for example the work
of Amgoud and Vesic [3]. Here we use the following lifting: if argument a is preferred
to argument b, then all extensions containing argument a but not b are either better than
all extensions containing b but not a, or the two extensions are incomparable.
Definition 5 Let E(A ,Def) be a set of extensions according to a Dung semantics, and
let  is an order (irreflexive and transitive) over A , called preference relation. E ⊆A
is at least as good as E ′ ⊆A if ∀a,b ∈A : we do not have that a b and a ∈ E ′ \E and
b ∈ E \E ′. E is better than E ′ iff E at least as good as E ′ and E ′ not at least as good as
E. E is best if there is no E ′ that is better than E.
We can define a semantics of preference-based argumentation by a two-step process.
First we select the extensions of the framework according to a regular abstract semantics.
Then we use the preference relation to select the best extensions among them. We refer
to the following construction as PAF semantics 5. We identify Def=Att in Dung’s AF
and define E (A ,Att,) as a selection of the best extensions of E(A ,Att).
Definition 6 The extensions E (A ,Att,) are the best extensions among E(A ,Att)
based on .
In preference elicitation, the preferences are extracted from a user step by step. As-
sume now that for each step where a user is querying for a preference, we consider the
arguments the user accepts, given the knowledge about the preference relation thus far.
In such a setting, it would be quite useful if the set of accepted arguments is increasing
monotonically. Moreover, the other way around, we can even consider scenarios where
the interest in the extension guides the order in which the preferences are elicited.
It is important to note that this construction is very different from the reduction-
based semantics, and thus leads very different extensions. In Example 4, there is only one
extension {a}, and thus there is only one preferred extension {a}. In Example 5 there is
either no extension (for stable) or one extension {} (all other semantics). Thus, in both
cases the extension selection-based semantics coincides with reduction 3.
Example 4 Consider the framework below under preferred or stable semantics. The left
PAF prefers extension {a,c} over extension {b,d}, but if we add b  a then both {a,c}
and {b,d} are best extensions.
a b
cd
a d
a b
cd
a d,b a
This is just one of the many possibilities, and its simplicity has some drawbacks. For
example, if the empty set is an extension, e.g. in complete semantics, then it is always
a best extension. Just like in the case of the reductions, this illustrates that more alter-
natives can be defined, and a principle-based approach is needed to choose among the
alternatives. We leave a further study of this for future research.
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4. Principle-based analysis
In this section, we investigate the definition of some general criteria for evaluating PAFs.
Amgoud and Vesic [3] introduce two principles, called conflict-freeness and generalisa-
tion. We also use conflict-freeness for our principle-based analysis, but in addition we
define principles based on extension growth and selection. Principle 1 is a version of the
conflict-freeness principle for preference-based argumentation introduced by Amgoud
and Vesic [3]. If a attacks b then there is no extension containing both a and b.
• Principle 1 (P1): Conflict-freeness
If (a,b) ∈ Att then 6 ∃E ∈ E (A ,Att,)| {a,b} ⊆ E.
Principle 2 and 3 are inspired by the idea that preferences are used to select the best
among all extensions. The rationale behind Principle 4 is that increasing the number of
expressed preferences can have the effect that the number of extensions decreases, or
that the extension grows. The same holds for Principle 5. Principle 6, instead, states that
increasing the number of preferences does not increase the number of extensions.
• Principle 2 (P2): Preference selects extensions 1
E (A ,Att, ∪′)⊆ E (A ,Att,).
• Principle 3 (P3): Preference selects extensions 2
E (A ,Att,)⊆ E (A ,Att,{}).
• Principle 4 (P4): Extension refinement
∀E ∈ E (A ,Att, ∪′), ∃E ′ ∈ E (A ,Att,) | E ′ ⊆ E.
• Principle 5 (P5): Extension growth⋂
E (A ,Att,)⊆⋂E (A ,Att, ∪′).
• Principle 6 (P6): Number of extensions
|E (A ,Att, ∪′)| ≤ |E (A ,Att,)|.
P2 implies P3 and P6 but not vice versa. Moreover, P4 implies P5 but not vice versa. The
reader may argue that the way P4 and P5 are formulated resembles the skeptical relations
between semantics introduced by Baroni and Giacomin [6]. Investigating how to express
principles on the basis of these skeptical relations is left for future work.
Table 1 reports satisfiability of Reductions with respect to the above defined princi-
ples, focusing on standard Dung’s semantics. The question mark refers to an open prob-
lem. If a letter is missing, it means that there is a counterexample. For example, if we
consider Conflict-freeness (P1) and Extension Growth (P5) as required properties, then
these results indicate that we either should select R3 or PAF Semantics 5, and we should
adopt either grounded or complete semantics.
Red. P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
R1 × × × GC GC G
R2 CGPS × × × × G
R3 CGPS CS CS CGS CGS CGS P?
R4 CGPS × × × × G
S5 CGPS G CGPS CG CG G
Table 1. Comparison among the resolutions and the proposed principles. We refer to Dung’s semantics as
follows: Complete (C), Grounded (G), Preferred (P), Stable (S). When a principle is never satisfied by a certain
reduction for all semantics, we use the × symbol. P1 refers to Principle 1, the same holds for the others.
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Example 3 is a counterexample for P1 for Reduction 1 for all semantics. The positive
results for P1 rely on the notion of conflict-freeness. Examples 1-2 are counterexamples
for P2 and P3 for Reduction 1 for all semantics, P2 and P5 for Reduction 2 and 4 for
all semantics. Example 3 is a counterexample for P2 and P6 for Reduction 1, 2, 4 for
stable semantics. The positive results for Reduction 1 and 3 follows from the fact that
attack relation is shrinking. Concerning P2 and P3 for Reductions 1-4, the left example in
Example 5 is a counterexample for grounded semantics. The right example in Example 5
is a counterexample to P2 and P5 for Reduction 1-4 for preferred semantics.
Example 5 Assume the PAF on the left. Reductions 1-4 coincide. Without preference
the grounded extension is {}, with preference {a}. Assume the PAF on the right. All
reductions coincide. Without preference the unique preferred or stable extension is {a},
with preference the preferred extension is {}, and the stable extension does not exist.
c
a
b
a c
c
a
b
c
a
b
c a
c
a
b
The following example is a counterexample to P2 and P3 for Reduction 1 and 2. It is also
a counterexample to P2 and P3 for Reduction 4 for all semantics except grounded.
Example 6 Assume the PAF below. Without preference the complete extensions are {}
and {a}, the former is the grounded extension and the latter is the preferred or stable
extension. For R1, all semantics coincide and the extension is {a,b}. For R2, all seman-
tics coincide and the extension is {b}. For R3, the extensions are the same as for the
framework without preference. For R4, the complete extensions are {}, {a} and {b}, the
first is the grounded extension, and the latter two are the preferred or stable extensions.
c
a
b
b a
c
a
b
c
a
b
c
a
b
c
a
b
Example 4 shows that PAF Semantics 5 does not satisfy P2 for complete, preferred and
stable, and Example 3 shows the same for P6. Moreover, it does not satisfy P4 and P5
for preferred and stable. The positive results for PAF Semantics 5 and P3 follow directly
from the definitions. Example 7 is a counterexample to P6 for Reduction 1, 2 and 4, for
all semantics except grounded.
Example 7 Assume the PAF below. Without preference the complete extensions are {}
and {a,d}, the former is the grounded extension and the latter is the preferred or stable
extension. For R1, all semantics coincide, and the extensions are {a,b,e}, {a,b, f} and
{a,b,g}. For R2, all semantics coincide and the extensions are {b,e}, {b, f} and {b,g}.
For R4, the complete extensions are {}, {a,d}, {b,e}, {b, f} and {b,g}.
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c
a
b d f
e
g
b a
5. Related work
We distinguish between different proposals to integrate preferences in argumentation.
Amgoud et al. [2] construct arguments from a set of classical propositional formulas per-
vaded with priorities, allowing to associate a strength to each argument. The preference
relation is defined on the strength of the arguments. In valued-based argumentation [7],
arguments are associated to values. The preference relation over arguments is derived
from the preference relation over values. The more important the value, the more pre-
ferred the argument is. Modgil [11] derives the preference relation from arguments sup-
porting preferences between arguments. The common point of these preference-based
argumentation frameworks is that they all rely on Reduction 1, thus violating conflict-
freeness of extensions with respect to the attack relation. Amgoud and Vesic [3] have pro-
posed a new PAF which satisfies two requirements: conflict-freeness of extensions with
respect to the attack relation (this is Principle 1 in our analysis), and, in the absence of
critical attacks, the extensions of a preference-based argumentation framework coincide
with the extensions of Dung’s argumentation framework. Moreover the PAF handles crit-
ical attacks following Reduction 2. The second requirement can be simply reformulated
as if the preference relation is empty, meaning that the extensions of a PAF and Dung’s
framework coincide. This is a special case of Principle 3 in our analysis. To compute
extensions, Amgoud and Vesic [3] define a preference relation over the powerset of argu-
ments using the so-called democtratic and elitist relations. Maximal conflict-free subsets
are extensions of the PAF (grounded, preferred and stable extensions). Our Definition 5
is incomparable with democtratic and elitist relations. Definition 5 applies on the PAF
with ignoring the associated preference relation while [3] applies democtratic and elitist
relations on the PAF with Reduction 2.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an axiomatic approach to preference-based semantics. We
considered four reductions to move from PAFs to a Dung-like abstract argumentation on
which standard semantics can be applied to compute the set of accepted arguments, and
we proposed a set of six principles we used to study the considered reductions.
The results of this paper give rise to many new research questions. Many more prin-
ciples can be defined in our framework (e.g., following [13]), and used in the analysis.
In particular, it is striking that many principles have a dynamic flavor, and we conjec-
ture that many approaches to dynamics of argumentation [8] can be used as a source
for principles. We are in particular interested in principles that distinguish the various
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PAF semantics. We believe that there are not many new reductions to be found, but more
PAF semantics can be defined not based on reductions. We observe that the resolution-
based family of abstract argumentation semantics [4] seems also related to Reduction 3
introduced in this paper, as well as the results of Kaci et al. [10].
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